Political meritocracy (the 'China model' debate)

Political meritocracy is the idea that public office should go to those with superior ability and virtue, identified by examinations and by performance at lower levels of government, rather than to whoever wins a popular vote. In The China Model (2015), the political theorist Daniel A. Bell argues that this ideal, rooted in Confucian thought and the imperial examination system, can remedy flaws of electoral democracy such as short-termism, the neglect of future generations and non-voters, and the selection of leaders for campaigning skill rather than competence. He describes an idealised Chinese pattern as 'vertical democratic meritocracy': democracy at the local level, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top.

Bell's argument has two parts. Normatively, he holds that a well-designed meritocratic system may choose better top leaders than one-person-one-vote in a large country. Descriptively, he claims that the Chinese Communist Party's cadre system, with its exams, rotations and performance evaluations, already embodies the ideal imperfectly. He acknowledges three problems that any political meritocracy faces, corruption, ossification of the hierarchy and legitimacy, and argues that the first two can be eased without elections but the legitimacy problem requires more opportunities for political participation. Related ideas include Plato's guardians, Mencius's ruler who serves the people, and modern epistocracy.

• China's cadre evaluation and promotion system, in which local leaders are assessed partly on economic and other targets.
• Singapore's recruitment of ministers from the civil service and military scholarship elite.
• Historically, the Chinese imperial examinations (abolished in 1905).

Critics challenge both parts. On the description, Andrew Nathan argues that China's system rewards loyalty and patronage more than merit and lacks the independent checks that would make merit verifiable. Empirical studies of promotions disagree: Li and Zhou (2005) find that provincial leaders with better growth records were more likely to be promoted; Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012) find no evidence that growth performance was rewarded with higher rank in the Central Committee, and point instead to factional ties, education and revenue collection; Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim (2015) find that performance matters mainly for officials who also have connections. On the ideal, democratic theorists object that merit at the top cannot be judged without accountability to those ruled, that there is no neutral standard of political merit, and that the system offers no peaceful way to correct a bad leader, a concern sharpened by the 2018 removal of presidential term limits. Contributors to a 2016 Perspectives on Politics symposium questioned whether the book describes an ideal or a reality.

The debate has made political meritocracy a serious topic in political theory, alongside epistocracy and technocracy. The empirical record of China's promotion system is mixed, and there is no agreement that meritocratic selection explains China's economic performance.