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Article

Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China

Hongbin Li; Li-An Zhou · Journal of Public Economics 89(9–10), 1743–1762 · 2005

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Type: Article
Author: Hongbin Li; Li-An Zhou
Identifier: DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.009
Accessed: 2026-09-01

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DisputedWhether China's cadre system rewards performance is disputed: Li and Zhou (2005) find that provincial leaders' promotion chances rose with economic growth, whereas Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012) find no evidence that growth was rewarded with higher Central Committee rank and point to factional ties, education and revenue collection.DisputedProvincial leaders in reform-era China were more likely to be promoted, and less likely to be dismissed, when their provinces' economies grew faster.