Majoritarian and consensus democracy

Democracies answer the question "who governs when people disagree?" in two broad ways. The majoritarian answer is: the majority, or the largest plurality, should govern, and the minority should oppose and wait for its turn. The consensus answer is: as many people as possible should share in government, through broad coalitions, separated powers and protections for minorities.

Arend Lijphart turned this contrast into a measurable typology in Patterns of Democracy (1999; second edition 2012), comparing 36 established democracies. The typology is distinct from, though related to, his earlier theory of consociationalism, which concerns elite power-sharing in deeply divided societies.

Ten variables, two dimensions

Lijphart identified ten institutional differences and found that they cluster into two dimensions.

Executives–parties dimension (joint power):

1. Single-party majority cabinets versus broad multiparty coalitions.
2. Executive dominance versus executive–legislative balance.
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.
5. Pluralist interest-group systems versus coordinated, corporatist systems.

Federal–unitary dimension (divided power):

1. Unitary and centralised versus federal and decentralised government.
2. Unicameral versus strong bicameral legislatures.
3. Flexible constitutions amendable by simple majority versus rigid constitutions requiring supermajorities.
4. Legislative supremacy versus judicial review.
5. Central banks dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.

The United Kingdom (before devolution and other reforms) and New Zealand (before 1996) were his archetypes of the majoritarian or Westminster model; Switzerland and Belgium of the consensus model.

Measuring fragmentation

The effective number of parties, devised by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (1979), weights parties by their share of votes or seats and is a key indicator for the first dimension.

The performance claim

Lijphart argued that consensus democracies perform as well as majoritarian ones on macroeconomic management and better on what he called "kinder, gentler" qualities: women's representation, voter turnout, satisfaction with democracy, welfare effort, environmental performance, lower incarceration and lower inequality. He concluded that the consensus model is the better choice for new democracies.

Proportional and majoritarian visions

G. Bingham Powell framed a related contrast between a majoritarian vision, in which elections give voters a clear choice of government and clear accountability, and a proportional vision, in which elections produce a legislature that mirrors the electorate and bargains on its behalf. Each delivers a different kind of responsiveness.

• New Zealand moved from a Westminster system to mixed-member proportional representation after referendums in 1992 and 1993 (in the binding 1993 vote, 53.9 per cent chose MMP), with the first MMP election in 1996; single-party majority governments then became rare.
• Switzerland combines a federal structure, strong bicameralism, a collegial seven-member Federal Council shared among the main parties, and frequent referendums.
• Belgium and the Netherlands rely on multiparty coalitions and, in Belgium's case, linguistic federalism.
• The United Kingdom remains closer to the majoritarian model at Westminster, but devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the creation of a Supreme Court in 2009 moved it along the second dimension.

• Statistical fragility: Klaus Armingeon, using data on 22 OECD countries from 1971 to 1996, found that consensus democracy is not "kinder, gentler", though neither is it worse; corporatism, rather than consensus institutions as such, explained lower unemployment and inflation and larger welfare states.
• Bundling: Rein Taagepera questioned the logical coherence of combining the variables into dimensions and argued that some variables are causes of others, which complicates claims about performance.
• Cultural confounding: many consensus democracies are small, wealthy, homogeneous Northern European states; their performance may reflect history and social structure rather than institutions.
• Accountability costs: majoritarian defenders argue that coalitions blur responsibility, so voters cannot "throw the rascals out", and that bargaining after elections lets parties override voters' choices.
• Gridlock: multiple veto points can block reform; Belgium went 541 days without a full government in 2010–2011.
• Survey of findings: Manfred Schmidt's review found robust links between types of democracy and policy outcomes but cautioned that institutions constrain rather than determine choices.

The majoritarian–consensus typology is one of the most widely used frameworks in comparative politics and a practical guide for constitution-makers choosing electoral systems, cabinet rules and federal arrangements. The empirical claim that consensus democracy simply performs better is contested; what holds up more firmly is that proportional, coalition-based systems tend to produce more representative legislatures and broader policy compromises, while majoritarian systems offer clearer accountability and more decisive governments. The design choice is a trade-off, not a free lunch.

• Klaus Armingeon, "The effects of negotiation democracy" (2002)
• Rein Taagepera, "Arend Lijphart's Dimensions of Democracy" (2003)
• Manfred G. Schmidt, "Political performance and types of democracy" (2002)
• Laakso and Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties" (1979)
• New Zealand Electoral Commission, 1992 and 1993 electoral referendums
• Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press, 2nd edn, 2012)
• G. Bingham Powell Jr., Elections as Instruments of Democracy (Yale University Press, 2000)