Idea
Two levels of government each have their own domain and some protection from the other. Regional units usually also take part in making national decisions, for instance through a second chamber.
Theory
William Riker (1964) treated federations as bargains among regional elites. Alfred Stepan distinguished federations formed by "coming together", "holding together" and "putting together". Wallace Oates's fiscal-federalism argument holds that some public goods are better matched to regional preferences, and Brandeis's "laboratories" image stresses policy experiment.
Real examples
- United States (1787 Constitution), Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867) and Australia (1901).
- Germany: the Basic Law, Article 79(3), puts the division of the Federation into Länder beyond the reach of constitutional amendment.
Critique
Federal arrangements can protect local majorities as well as minorities; "states' rights" was used to defend racial segregation in the United States. Critics cite coordination failures, regional inequality and weak enforcement of national standards.
Results
Federations are among the most durable constitutional forms but their effects on growth, inequality and democratic stability are disputed and depend on design.
Related
Claims
Federalism divides authority between a central and regional governments, each with a constitutionally protected domain that neither can unilaterally remove; regional units typically also share in national decision-making.[1][2][3][4]
Article 79(3) of Germany's Basic Law makes inadmissible any amendment that affects the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation in principle in legislation, or the principles of Articles 1 and 20.[1]
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932), wrote that a single courageous state may serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.[1]
Revision history
- 2026-10-23rev 1 — Seed import