Saudi Arabia: centralised monarchy under Salman and Mohammed bin Salman (2015–present)

Background

King Salman acceded in January 2015 at the age of 79. Within months he appointed his son Mohammed bin Salman (often called MBS), then in his late twenties, defence minister and head of a new economic council, and named him deputy crown prince in April 2015. In June 2017 Salman removed his nephew Mohammed bin Nayef as crown prince and replaced him with Mohammed bin Salman. Freedom House notes that bin Nayef was stripped of all positions and detained in 2020 together with a brother of the king. In September 2022 Mohammed bin Salman also became prime minister.

How it is governed

• Absolute monarchy, personalised. The formal rules are unchanged: the Basic Law of 1992 and the Allegiance Commission Law of 2006. Under the 2006 law the king may propose candidates for crown prince and the commission of princes may nominate its own, with a vote if they disagree. In practice the transfer of succession to the king's son in 2017 ended the lateral, consensual model, and the crown prince controls defence, security, the economy and the sovereign wealth fund.
• Elimination of rival power centres. In November 2017 the anti-corruption commission headed by the crown prince detained more than 300 people, including princes, ministers and businessmen, at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh; many were released after handing over assets in out-of-court settlements. Prominent clerics and businessmen were arrested. The US intelligence assessment of 2021 judges that since 2017 the crown prince has had "absolute control" of the security and intelligence organisations.
• Consultation without election. The 150-member Consultative Council remains appointed and advisory; women's share reached 20 percent in 2024. Municipal elections due in 2019 were postponed indefinitely.

Economy: Vision 2030

Vision 2030, launched in April 2016, aims to reduce dependence on oil through new industries, tourism, entertainment and mining, privatisation, a larger private sector and more Saudi employment, including women's. Its instruments include the Public Investment Fund, which has grown into one of the world's largest sovereign funds, the partial listing of Aramco in 2019, giga-projects such as NEOM, and a 5 percent VAT (tripled to 15 percent in 2020). The IMF reports non-oil real GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 2024 and record-low unemployment among Saudi nationals, while oil still accounts for about three-quarters of exports. ILO modelled estimates show female labour-force participation rising from about 23 percent in 2016 to about 33 percent in 2024. Natural-resource rents fell from 55 percent of GDP in 2008 to about 26 percent in 2021, mainly because of oil prices.

Social change

Women were allowed to drive from June 2018, and guardianship rules were relaxed in 2019 so that adult women can obtain passports and travel without a male guardian's permission; the powers of the religious police were curtailed from 2016, and cinemas, concerts and mixed public events were permitted. Freedom House reports that a 2022 personal status law preserved male guardianship in general while expanding women's rights in divorce and custody, and that in 2025 kafala sponsorship was replaced by contract-based employment for migrant workers.

Repression and rights

• Activists. Several of the women who had campaigned for the right to drive were arrested in May 2018, weeks before the ban was lifted, and later convicted; Freedom House reports allegations of torture and sexual abuse in detention.
• The Khashoggi killing. On 2 October 2018 the journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed by a team of Saudi agents in the consulate in Istanbul. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence assessed in 2021 that the crown prince approved an operation to capture or kill him; the Saudi government rejected the assessment, and no senior official has been held accountable.
• Speech. Counterterrorism and cybercrime laws are used against social media users; Freedom House reports a 2023 death sentence for a retired teacher over posts on X and YouTube.
• Executions. Freedom House counts at least 170 executions in 2023, 345 in 2024 and 356 in 2025, many of them foreign nationals convicted of drug offences, including people arrested as minors.
• Yemen and borders. Saudi Arabia has led a military coalition in Yemen since 2015, and Human Rights Watch reported in 2023 that border guards killed hundreds of Ethiopian migrants crossing from Yemen.

Debates

• Reform from above or consolidation? Supporters see a modernising ruler breaking clerical and bureaucratic resistance; critics see personal rule that has removed the family's internal checks.
• Can diversification work under an absolute ruler? Non-oil growth is real, but much of it is driven by state spending; whether private investment and productivity follow is unresolved.
• Succession. The 2006 rules remain on paper, but no transfer of power has yet tested them under the new configuration.

Lessons for institution design

• Codified succession rules are only as strong as the actors who enforce them. The Allegiance Commission did not prevent the move to a single line of descent.
• Social liberalisation and political repression can go together. Rights granted by decree can be accompanied by the punishment of those who asked for them.

Further reading

• Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2026: Saudi Arabia
• ODNI, Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi (2021)
• IMF, 2025 Article IV consultation with Saudi Arabia