Idea
Political authority is justified, if at all, because free and equal persons would agree to it. The state is treated as an artefact of consent rather than natural or divine order.
Theory
Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) has individuals authorise a sovereign to escape the state of nature. Locke's Two Treatises (1689) grounds government in consent and natural rights and allows resistance to tyranny. Rousseau's Du contrat social (1762) centres on the general will. Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) uses a hypothetical choice behind a veil of ignorance. Contemporary writers separate contractarian (self-interest) from contractualist (reasonable justification) strands.
Real examples
- The US Declaration of Independence (1776) says governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.
- Constitution-making is often framed as a social contract; Rojava's 2014 charter was titled a "Charter of the Social Contract".
Critique
Hume argued that no such contract existed and that tacit consent is unrealistic. Carole Pateman and Charles Mills argued that the classic contract rests on unacknowledged sexual and racial domination. Hypothetical agreement may not bind anyone actually.
Results
The theory remains a leading framework for legitimacy and justice, but not an accepted historical account of how states arose.
Related
Claims
Social contract theories ground political authority in agreement or hypothetical consent; Hobbes (1651), Locke (1689), Rousseau (1762) and Rawls (1971) are canonical versions that differ on what is agreed, by whom, and why.[1][2][3][4][5]
Critics argue that the classical social contract is a historical fiction and that it conceals domination: Hume denied any actual original contract, Pateman argued that it presupposes a sexual contract, and Mills that it presupposes a racial contract.[1][2][3]
Revision history
- 2026-10-23rev 1 — Seed import