Idea
Legitimacy flows from the public exchange of reasons among those bound by a decision, not only from voting or bargaining. Joshua Cohen (1989) and Bernard Manin (1987) are early formulations.
Theory
In Between Facts and Norms (1992) Habermas gave a two-track account: opinion forms in the informal public sphere and civil society, and flows through channels into parliaments and courts, which turn it into binding law. Private and public autonomy are co-original: citizens can see themselves as authors of the laws that bind them.
Real examples
Citizens' assemblies, deliberative polls and similar mini-publics are used to feed considered public opinion into decisions, for example the citizens' assembly process in Ireland.
Critique
Cass Sunstein found that deliberation among like-minded people can polarise. Critics add that participants may be unrepresentative, that powerful actors can dominate discussion, and that mini-publics often lack binding force.
Results
A normative standard and research programme rather than a tested mechanism. Britannica describes Habermas's ideal as justifying deliberative liberal-democratic institutions.
Related
Real examples
A chair and 99 randomly selected citizens who deliberated on constitutional questions, including the Eighth Amendment on abortion.
Claims
Joshua Cohen (1989) and Bernard Manin (1987) are early formulations of the view that the legitimacy of collective decisions depends on public deliberation among those bound by them.[1][2]
Cass Sunstein argued in 2002 that deliberating groups tend to move to more extreme positions in the direction of their members' initial leanings, a phenomenon he called group polarization.[1]
In Between Facts and Norms Habermas described democracy as 'two-tracked': informal public spheres form opinion that percolates through channels into parliamentary bodies, which turn it into law.[1][2]
Revision history
- 2026-10-23rev 1 — Seed import