Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
Hongbin Li,Li-An Zhou — Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China (2005)Hongbin Li; Li-An Zhou · 2005 · Article · abstract (provincial leaders 1979–1995)DisputedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-1089 · as of 2026-10-30 · about: China's reform era: experimentation under hierarchy (1978–2012) · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“Provincial leaders in reform-era China were more likely to be promoted, and less likely to be dismissed, when their provinces' economies grew faster.”
Context. Li and Zhou find a performance link for provincial turnover; Shih, Adolph and Liu find no evidence that growth raised Central Committee rank and stress factional ties, education and revenue collection.
Evidence that supports
1Evidence that contradicts
1Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China
Victor Shih,Christopher Adolph,Mingxing Liu — Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China (2012)Victor Shih; Christopher Adolph; Mingxing Liu · 2012 · Article · abstract (no growth reward in Central Committee ranks)Status history
No earlier revisions.
Disputes
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