Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
Hongbin Li,Li-An Zhou — Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China (2005)Hongbin Li; Li-An Zhou · 2005 · 文章有争议已附来源 · 尚未独立核实CLM-1049 · 截至 2026-10-30 · 涉及：政治精英治理（“中国模式”之争） · 作者：Polity Atlas editorial team
“中国干部制度是否奖励绩效存在争议：Li and Zhou（2005）发现，省级领导人的晋升机会随经济增长而上升；而 Shih, Adolph and Liu（2012）没有发现经济增长会带来更高的中央委员会排名，并指出派系关系、教育程度和税收征集也有影响。”
背景。 Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim（2015）在一定程度上调和了这些发现：绩效对那些同时与高级领导人有关系的官员影响最大。
支持的证据
1反驳的证据
1Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China
Victor Shih,Christopher Adolph,Mingxing Liu — Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China (2012)Victor Shih; Christopher Adolph; Mingxing Liu · 2012 · 文章 · Abstract背景
Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance
状态历史
没有更早的修订。
异议
尚无异议提交。