Idea
Voters receive a budget of credits and buy votes on issues they care about; casting n votes on one issue costs n² credits, so intensity of preference counts, but with sharply rising cost.
Theory
Lalley and Weyl (2018) show that under certain assumptions quadratic pricing leads to efficient collective decisions. It sits between one-person-one-vote and markets in which money buys outcomes.
Real examples
- Democrats in the Colorado House used quadratic voting in 2019 to prioritise bills.
- Taiwan's Presidential Hackathon used it to rank projects.
- Many DAOs and online communities experiment with it.
Critique
The mechanism is vulnerable to collusion and to fake identities (Sybil attacks), which split budgets across accounts. Its efficiency results rely on assumptions that real electorates may not meet.
Results
Used successfully for prioritisation inside organisations; not used for binding public elections.
Cost calculator
Budget: 100 voice credits4 votes cost 16 credits — 16% of the budget. 84 credits left for other issues.
Claims
Under quadratic voting, casting n votes on an issue costs n² voice credits, so people can express intensity of preference at increasing marginal cost.[1][2]
Quadratic voting is vulnerable to collusion and to Sybil attacks in which one person controls several identities.[1]
Revision history
- 2026-10-23rev 2 — Seed import
- 2026-10-23rev 1 — Seed import