Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism
Jonathan A. Rodden — Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (2006)Jonathan A. Rodden · 2006 · Book · publisher's abstractTheorySource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0683 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Federation · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“Where a central government funds most subnational spending but can neither credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments nor monopolise borrowing, as in Brazil and Germany, fiscal federalism tends to weaken subnational fiscal discipline.”
Evidence that supports
1Evidence that contradicts
0No counter-evidence recorded.
Context
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development
Status history
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