Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
Alberto Alesina,Lawrence H. Summers — Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)Alberto Alesina; Lawrence H. Summers · 1993 · Article · AbstractDisputedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0565 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Technocracy · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“In a sample of sixteen OECD countries, Alesina and Summers found that greater central bank independence was associated with lower and less variable inflation but had little evident effect on growth, unemployment or real interest rates; whether independence causes these outcomes is disputed.”
Context. Later studies question causality and the measures of independence used, and note that low-inflation societies may choose independent central banks.
Evidence that supports
1Evidence that contradicts
0No counter-evidence recorded.
Status history
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