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Sources
Article
Incumbent performance and electoral control
John Ferejohn · Public Choice 50(1–3), 5–25 · 1986
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BibTeX
Type
Article
Author
John Ferejohn
Identifier
DOI 10.1007/BF00124924
Accessed
2026-09-01
Claims citing this source
1 claims
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Established
Exploiting the random selection of Brazilian municipalities for federal audits from 2003, Ferraz and Finan compared municipalities audited before and after the 2004 elections with the same reported corruption and found that releasing the findings hurt corrupt incumbents' electoral performance, especially where local radio was present.
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