Polity Atlas
EstablishedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0596 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Principal–agent theory of government · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team

“Exploiting the random selection of Brazilian municipalities for federal audits from 2003, Ferraz and Finan compared municipalities audited before and after the 2004 elections with the same reported corruption and found that releasing the findings hurt corrupt incumbents' electoral performance, especially where local radio was present.”

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1

Evidence that contradicts

0

No counter-evidence recorded.

Context

Incumbent performance and electoral control

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