How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | A junta of the four service commanders held constituent and legislative power and decided by unanimity; Pinochet held executive power. Economic policy was delegated to a team of Chicago-trained economists. | Each listed body sets its own well-being objectives and steps; the Welsh Ministers publish national indicators and a future trends report after each election. | Collective leadership in the Politburo Standing Committee; party control of personnel through the Organization Department; local governments ran economies and piloted policies under central veto.Term limits and rotation of office | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Military courts and a state of siege; secret police detention; courts rarely granted habeas corpus. A 1978 amnesty decree shielded abuses. | The Commissioner may review a body and recommend; the body must take reasonable steps to follow or publish reasons (s 22). The Auditor General examines application of the principle. | Party discipline commissions, courts under party leadership, petition offices; mass protest met with repression, most lethally in June 1989. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Privatised pensions, vouchers and municipal schools, targeted social programmes; copper remained state-owned through Codelco. | Covers the Welsh Ministers, local authorities, health boards, national park authorities and other listed bodies; public services boards plan locally. | Fiscal decentralisation with local land revenues; infrastructure and education expanded rapidly; health and pension coverage rebuilt in the 2000s. | |
| How is AI used? | None. | No documented AI role. | None at system level; digital government grew late in the period. | |
| What are the main risks? | Systematic human rights violations, financial fragility under a fixed exchange rate, very high inequality, and constitutional enclaves outlasting the regime.CLM-1181 | Soft 'follow or explain' enforcement; procedural compliance; difficulty measuring long-term and preventative benefits. | Corruption, local debt and land seizures driven by growth targets, environmental damage, factionalism, and rules on succession without independent enforcement.CLM-1089CLM-1091 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.