How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Ayatollah Khomeini as Leader, an elected president, a prime minister and the Majlis, with the Guardian Council vetting laws; revolutionary bodies alongside the state. | Collective leadership in the Politburo Standing Committee; party control of personnel through the Organization Department; local governments ran economies and piloted policies under central veto.Term limits and rotation of office | Each listed body sets its own well-being objectives and steps; the Welsh Ministers publish national indicators and a future trends report after each election. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Khomeini's arbitration, then the Expediency Council (1988); revolutionary courts for political cases. | Party discipline commissions, courts under party leadership, petition offices; mass protest met with repression, most lethally in June 1989. | The Commissioner may review a body and recommend; the body must take reasonable steps to follow or publish reasons (s 22). The Auditor General examines application of the principle. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Nationalised banks and industries, rationing during the war, and a new rural development and primary health-care programme; bonyads ran charities and businesses. | Fiscal decentralisation with local land revenues; infrastructure and education expanded rapidly; health and pension coverage rebuilt in the 2000s. | Covers the Welsh Ministers, local authorities, health boards, national park authorities and other listed bodies; public services boards plan locally. | |
| How is AI used? | None. | None at system level; digital government grew late in the period. | No documented AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | War, factional conflict between radicals and conservatives, dependence on one charismatic leader, and violent repression of opponents. | Corruption, local debt and land seizures driven by growth targets, environmental damage, factionalism, and rules on succession without independent enforcement.CLM-1089CLM-1091 | Soft 'follow or explain' enforcement; procedural compliance; difficulty measuring long-term and preventative benefits. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.