Polity Atlas

How each model solves the same problems

Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.

Question✕✕✕
How are decisions made?A dominant presidency with a small circle of security-service and business allies; a Duma controlled by United Russia; regional governors appointed (2005–2012) or elected under filters.Power concentrated in the party centre and in Xi Jinping as 'core'; central commissions chaired by Xi; presidential term limits removed in 2018; party bodies absorbed government functions.Collective leadership in the Politburo Standing Committee; party control of personnel through the Organization Department; local governments ran economies and piloted policies under central veto.Term limits and rotation of office
How are conflicts resolved?Courts that rarely ruled against the Kremlin in political cases; elite disputes settled by the president; selective prosecution of rivals.Party discipline commissions and supervisory commissions with extrajudicial detention (liuzhi); courts under party leadership; online petition and complaint platforms.Party discipline commissions, courts under party leadership, petition offices; mass protest met with repression, most lethally in June 1989.
How are public goods funded?Pensions, wages and infrastructure financed largely by oil and gas revenue; a reserve fund built in the boom years.State-led industrial policy, poverty-alleviation campaigns, infrastructure; local governments squeezed by debt and reduced land revenue.Fiscal decentralisation with local land revenues; infrastructure and education expanded rapidly; health and pension coverage rebuilt in the 2000s.
How is AI used?No algorithmic governance; growing use of digital surveillance and online censorship by the end of the period.AI-enabled surveillance (facial recognition, big-data policing, IJOP in Xinjiang); algorithmic routing of citizen complaints.None at system level; digital government grew late in the period.
What are the main risks?Dependence on hydrocarbon rents, erosion of the institutions that could replace leaders, and escalating repression and external aggression.Unchecked personal power and succession uncertainty, mass repression in Xinjiang and Tibet, surveillance, reduced local initiative, and policy errors without public correction.CLM-1095Corruption, local debt and land seizures driven by growth targets, environmental damage, factionalism, and rules on succession without independent enforcement.CLM-1089CLM-1091

This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.