How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party, from the mid-1930s dominated personally by Stalin; soviets and the Supreme Soviet ratified decisions; Gosplan translated priorities into plans. | Power concentrated in the party centre and in Xi Jinping as 'core'; central commissions chaired by Xi; presidential term limits removed in 2018; party bodies absorbed government functions. | A stratified random sample of 523 voters deliberated in moderated groups and plenaries and answered questionnaires before and after; no decisions were taken.Sortition / citizens' assembly | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Inside the elite, by the general secretary and, in the 1930s, by purges; in society, by party committees, courts subordinate to the party and extrajudicial NKVD tribunals. | Party discipline commissions and supervisory commissions with extrajudicial detention (liuzhi); courts under party leadership; online petition and complaint platforms. | Balanced briefing materials, trained neutral moderators and competing experts structured disagreement. | |
| How are public goods funded? | State-provided schooling, health care, housing and pensions funded from the plan; priority for heavy industry and defence over consumption. | State-led industrial policy, poverty-alleviation campaigns, infrastructure; local governments squeezed by debt and reduced land revenue. | Privately funded; produced published results, media coverage and a peer-reviewed study. | |
| How is AI used? | None. | AI-enabled surveillance (facial recognition, big-data policing, IJOP in Xinjiang); algorithmic routing of citizen complaints. | No AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | No institutional check on the leader, information distorted by fear and plan bargaining, famine from coercive procurement, and mass state violence against citizens.CLM-1111 | Unchecked personal power and succession uncertainty, mass repression in Xinjiang and Tibet, surveillance, reduced local initiative, and policy errors without public correction.CLM-1095 | Self-selection into attendance; artificial setting; analysis by the method's designers; no institutional uptake. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.