How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | MKR- (now SKY-) weighted polls and executive votes on code changes, with delegation and a governance delay; restructured under the Endgame Plan and its rulebook. | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | Each listed body sets its own well-being objectives and steps; the Welsh Ministers publish national indicators and a future trends report after each election. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | On-chain votes and forum debate; losses absorbed by minting and auctioning governance tokens; compensation decided by token votes without legal obligation. | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | The Commissioner may review a body and recommend; the body must take reasonable steps to follow or publish reasons (s 22). The Auditor General examines application of the principle. | |
| How are public goods funded? | A decentralised stablecoin and open-source contracts; surplus used for token buy-and-burn and rewards rather than external public goods. | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | Covers the Welsh Ministers, local authorities, health boards, national park authorities and other listed bodies; public services boards plan locally. | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance; risk parameters are set by human votes using quantitative models. | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | No documented AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Concentration of voting power, low turnout, liquidation failures in market stress, reliance on centralised collateral and regulatory exposure. | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 | Soft 'follow or explain' enforcement; procedural compliance; difficulty measuring long-term and preventative benefits. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.