How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | The City Council and CLES convene anchor-institution leaders; each anchor sets its own procurement and employment policy within UK procurement law. | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | State legislature and governor set the dividend through the budget process. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | No formal mechanism: collaboration is voluntary among independent institutions. | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | Unknown | |
| How are public goods funded? | Living Wage employment, £100m of pension investment in Preston and South Ribble, and a Preston Co-operative Development Network with UCLan.Cooperative ownership | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | Returns of a publicly owned investment fund.Sovereign wealth fund dividend | |
| How is AI used? | No documented AI role. | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | No documented AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Attribution of outcomes is uncertain; critics call localist procurement 'zero sum' (Demos); dependence on public-sector anchors under austerity.CLM-0295 | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 | Political pressure to use fund earnings for the state budget instead of dividends. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.