Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
Douglass C. North,Barry R. Weingast — Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England (1989)Douglass C. North; Barry R. Weingast · 1989 · Article · abstractDisputedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0744 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Douglass North · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“North and Weingast (1989) argued that the institutions created after 1688 allowed the English government to commit credibly to upholding property rights, citing evidence from capital markets; Sussman and Yafeh (2006) found that British interest rates stayed high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution.”
Context. Sussman and Yafeh conclude that in the short run institutional reforms were not rewarded by financial markets: Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with weaker protection of property rights.
Evidence that supports
1Evidence that contradicts
1Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690–1790
Nathan Sussman,Yishay Yafeh — Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690–1790 (2006)Nathan Sussman; Yishay Yafeh · 2006 · Article · abstractContext
Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History
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