Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,James D. Morrow,Randolph M. Siverson,Alastair Smith — Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders (2002)Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; James D. Morrow; Randolph M. Siverson; Alastair Smith · 2002 · Article · AbstractTheorySource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0602 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Selectorate theory · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“Selectorate theory holds that leaders who depend on a small winning coalition focus on private goods for supporters at the expense of public goods, while larger coalitions push leaders towards effective public policy; a large selectorate fosters supporters' loyalty and lengthens tenure.”
Evidence that supports
4Policy Failure and Political Survival
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,James D. Morrow,Randolph M. Siverson,Alastair Smith — Policy Failure and Political Survival (1999)Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; James D. Morrow; Randolph M. Siverson; Alastair Smith · 1999 · Article · AbstractThe Logic of Political Survival
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith,Randolph M. Siverson,James D. Morrow — The Logic of Political Survival (2003)Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; Alastair Smith; Randolph M. Siverson; James D. Morrow · 2003 · Book · chs. 2–3The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith — The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics (2011)Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; Alastair Smith · 2011 · BookEvidence that contradicts
0No counter-evidence recorded.
Status history
No earlier revisions.
Disputes
No disputes have been filed.