Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,James D. Morrow,Randolph M. Siverson,Alastair Smith — Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders (2002)Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; James D. Morrow; Randolph M. Siverson; Alastair Smith · 2002 · 文章 · Abstract理论已附来源 · 尚未独立核实CLM-0602 · 截至 2026-10-27 · 涉及：选民集团理论 · 作者：Polity Atlas editorial team
“选民集团理论认为，依赖小型获胜联盟的领导人会优先向支持者提供私人产品，以牺牲公共产品为代价；较大的联盟则会促使领导人采取有效的公共政策。庞大的选民集团有助于巩固支持者的忠诚，并延长领导人的执政期限。”
支持的证据
4Policy Failure and Political Survival
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,James D. Morrow,Randolph M. Siverson,Alastair Smith — Policy Failure and Political Survival (1999)Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; James D. Morrow; Randolph M. Siverson; Alastair Smith · 1999 · 文章 · AbstractThe Logic of Political Survival
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith,Randolph M. Siverson,James D. Morrow — The Logic of Political Survival (2003)Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; Alastair Smith; Randolph M. Siverson; James D. Morrow · 2003 · 图书 · chs. 2–3The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith — The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics (2011)Bruce Bueno de Mesquita; Alastair Smith · 2011 · 图书反驳的证据
0尚无反证记录。
状态历史
没有更早的修订。
异议
尚无异议提交。