Kleros Short Paper v1.0.5
Clément Lesaege,Federico Ast — Kleros Short Paper v1.0.5 (2018)Clément Lesaege; Federico Ast · 2018 · Report · §2TheorySource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0352 · as of 2026-10-23 · about: Kleros (decentralised court) · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“The designers argue that honest voting is a Schelling point: jurors who cannot coordinate expect others to vote for the true answer, so honesty becomes the best strategy.”
Context. A design argument by the protocol's authors; it relies on jurors being unable to coordinate, which the appeal system is meant to restore.
Evidence that supports
2Game Theory (Kleros Documentation)
Game Theory (Kleros Documentation) (2026)2026 · Web pageEvidence that contradicts
0No counter-evidence recorded.
Status history
No earlier revisions.
Disputes
No disputes have been filed.