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Article

Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Elinor Ostrom · Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 137–158 · 2000

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Type: Article
Author: Elinor Ostrom
Identifier: DOI 10.1257/jep.14.3.137
Accessed: 2026-09-01
Reliability notes: Read in the working-paper version (W99-20, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 1999), Digital Library of the Commons: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5683

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EstablishedElinor Ostrom documented long-lived community institutions governing meadows, forests, irrigation water and fisheries, showing that common-pool resource problems are sometimes solved by the users' own organisations rather than by a coercive state or by privatisation.EstablishedElinor Ostrom (2000) wrote that extensive fieldwork shows people in all parts of the world voluntarily organising to provide mutual protection and to create and enforce rules protecting natural resources, challenging the 'zero contribution thesis' associated with Olson, while confirming that free riding remains a universal temptation.