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Article

Informational Autocrats

Sergei Guriev; Daniel Treisman · Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(4), 100–127 · 2019

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Type: Article
Author: Sergei Guriev; Daniel Treisman
Identifier: DOI 10.1257/jep.33.4.100
Accessed: 2026-09-01

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TheoryGuriev and Treisman document a shift in recent decades from dictatorships based on mass repression towards informational autocracies that manipulate beliefs about the ruler's competence, with less violence, concealed repression and imitation of democratic forms.TheoryPutin-era Russia before 2022 is best described as an 'informational autocracy' that relied on controlling information, imitating democratic institutions and selective repression rather than mass violence.