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The P + epsilon Attack
Vitalik Buterin · Ethereum Foundation Blog · 2015
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Type
Web page
Author
Vitalik Buterin
Accessed
2026-09-01
Claims citing this source
1 claims
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Theory
Schelling-point voting games of the kind Kleros uses are vulnerable to the 'P + epsilon' attack, in which an attacker credibly promises to pay voters for a false answer only if it loses, making that answer each voter's best response at no cost to the attacker.
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