How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | The king and, in practice, the crown prince and prime minister, through royal decrees, the Council of Ministers and councils for economic and security affairs; an appointed Shura Council advises. | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | A stratified random sample of 523 voters deliberated in moderated groups and plenaries and answered questionnaires before and after; no decisions were taken.Sortition / citizens' assembly | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Courts applying Sharia under judges appointed by the king; a Specialized Criminal Court for terrorism and dissent cases; no independent judiciary. | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | Balanced briefing materials, trained neutral moderators and competing experts structured disagreement. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Oil-funded welfare, public employment and subsidies, partly reformed by VAT, fee increases and subsidy cuts; large state-led investment through the Public Investment Fund. | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | Privately funded; produced published results, media coverage and a peer-reviewed study. | |
| How is AI used? | AI is promoted as an industry under Vision 2030; no algorithmic public decision-making is documented. Extensive surveillance of social media. | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | No AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Personal rule without internal checks, untested succession, dependence on oil revenue to fund giga-projects, and repression that leaves no channel for dissent.CLM-1135 | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 | Self-selection into attendance; artificial setting; analysis by the method's designers; no institutional uptake. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.