How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | The president and a narrow circle of security and military officials decide; the Duma, Federation Council and Security Council ratify. | Power concentrated in the party centre and in Xi Jinping as 'core'; central commissions chaired by Xi; presidential term limits removed in 2018; party bodies absorbed government functions. | A stratified random sample of 523 voters deliberated in moderated groups and plenaries and answered questionnaires before and after; no decisions were taken.Sortition / citizens' assembly | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Courts that follow the authorities in political cases; elite conflicts resolved by the president, sometimes violently; no independent arbiter. | Party discipline commissions and supervisory commissions with extrajudicial detention (liuzhi); courts under party leadership; online petition and complaint platforms. | Balanced briefing materials, trained neutral moderators and competing experts structured disagreement. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Military spending and payments to soldiers and their families have priority; pensions and services financed by oil and gas revenue under sanctions. | State-led industrial policy, poverty-alleviation campaigns, infrastructure; local governments squeezed by debt and reduced land revenue. | Privately funded; produced published results, media coverage and a peer-reviewed study. | |
| How is AI used? | No algorithmic governance; facial recognition and online surveillance are used against protesters and draft evaders. | AI-enabled surveillance (facial recognition, big-data policing, IJOP in Xinjiang); algorithmic routing of citizen complaints. | No AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Open-ended war, elite fragmentation (shown by the 2023 mutiny), economic strain from sanctions and war spending, and a succession with no agreed rules.CLM-1124 | Unchecked personal power and succession uncertainty, mass repression in Xinjiang and Tibet, surveillance, reduced local initiative, and policy errors without public correction.CLM-1095 | Self-selection into attendance; artificial setting; analysis by the method's designers; no institutional uptake. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.