How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | A dominant presidency with a small circle of security-service and business allies; a Duma controlled by United Russia; regional governors appointed (2005–2012) or elected under filters. | Grand Council of 50 chiefs chosen by clan mothers; questions pass between groups of nations, each seeking unanimity, with the Onondaga Firekeepers confirming or resolving disagreement. | Power concentrated in the party centre and in Xi Jinping as 'core'; central commissions chaired by Xi; presidential term limits removed in 2018; party bodies absorbed government functions. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Courts that rarely ruled against the Kremlin in political cases; elite disputes settled by the president; selective prosecution of rivals. | The Confederacy describes the Grand Council as resolving disputes among the nations and planning for the welfare of all the people. | Party discipline commissions and supervisory commissions with extrajudicial detention (liuzhi); courts under party leadership; online petition and complaint platforms. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Pensions, wages and infrastructure financed largely by oil and gas revenue; a reserve fund built in the boom years. | Unknown | State-led industrial policy, poverty-alleviation campaigns, infrastructure; local governments squeezed by debt and reduced land revenue. | |
| How is AI used? | No algorithmic governance; growing use of digital surveillance and online censorship by the end of the period. | No documented AI role. | AI-enabled surveillance (facial recognition, big-data policing, IJOP in Xinjiang); algorithmic routing of citizen complaints. | |
| What are the main risks? | Dependence on hydrocarbon rents, erosion of the institutions that could replace leaders, and escalating repression and external aggression. | Operates alongside US and Canadian governments, which limits its practical jurisdiction; its rule of unanimity within and between blocs requires broad agreement.CLM-0117CLM-0118 | Unchecked personal power and succession uncertainty, mass repression in Xinjiang and Tibet, surveillance, reduced local initiative, and policy errors without public correction.CLM-1095 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.