How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | One Noun, one vote on on-chain proposals (Governor Bravo fork with dynamic quorum and objection period); delegation allowed; a founders' veto as a safeguard.Exit rights | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | Kings of small kingdoms (túatha) under over-kings; assemblies (óenach); customary law expounded by hereditary jurists rather than legislated. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Votes and objection periods; ultimately exit through the fork mechanism, which gives forking holders a pro-rata share of the treasury. | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | Brehon judges; sureties (naidm, ráth, aitire); distraint of livestock; ritual fasting against higher-ranking defendants; body-fines and honour-price compensation.Arbitration | |
| How are public goods funded? | Funds art, open-source tools, events and charity through proposals, small grants and Prop House rounds. | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | Rules on shared grazing, co-operative ploughing, mills and fencing; obligatory hospitality; churches and monasteries; few public works. | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance. | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | None; a medieval legal order. | |
| What are the main risks? | Treasury arbitrage when treasury value per Noun exceeds its price, concentration of Nouns, falling auction demand and founder veto. | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 | Status-graded and unequal protection, unfree labour, endemic raiding and dynastic war, and vulnerability to a centralising conqueror.CLM-0385 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.