How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | MKR- (now SKY-) weighted polls and executive votes on code changes, with delegation and a governance delay; restructured under the Endgame Plan and its rulebook. | A 28-member General Council (half elected by parish, half by national list) elects the head of government; the co-princes sanction laws with countersignature. | Each listed body sets its own well-being objectives and steps; the Welsh Ministers publish national indicators and a future trends report after each election. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | On-chain votes and forum debate; losses absorbed by minting and auctioning governance tokens; compensation decided by token votes without legal obligation. | A four-member Constitutional Tribunal appointed by the co-princes and the General Council; ordinary courts. | The Commissioner may review a body and recommend; the body must take reasonable steps to follow or publish reasons (s 22). The Auditor General examines application of the principle. | |
| How are public goods funded? | A decentralised stablecoin and open-source contracts; surplus used for token buy-and-burn and rewards rather than external public goods. | Health, education and infrastructure funded by indirect, corporate and personal taxes; parishes run local services. | Covers the Welsh Ministers, local authorities, health boards, national park authorities and other listed bodies; public services boards plan locally. | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance; risk parameters are set by human votes using quantitative models. | No specific role for AI. | No documented AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Concentration of voting power, low turnout, liquidation failures in market stress, reliance on centralised collateral and regulatory exposure. | Clash between the episcopal co-prince and legislation such as abortion; exclusion of non-citizens; dependence on France, Spain and the EU. | Soft 'follow or explain' enforcement; procedural compliance; difficulty measuring long-term and preventative benefits. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.