How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | MKR- (now SKY-) weighted polls and executive votes on code changes, with delegation and a governance delay; restructured under the Endgame Plan and its rulebook. | Kings of small kingdoms (túatha) under over-kings; assemblies (óenach); customary law expounded by hereditary jurists rather than legislated. | A stratified random sample of 523 voters deliberated in moderated groups and plenaries and answered questionnaires before and after; no decisions were taken.Sortition / citizens' assembly | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | On-chain votes and forum debate; losses absorbed by minting and auctioning governance tokens; compensation decided by token votes without legal obligation. | Brehon judges; sureties (naidm, ráth, aitire); distraint of livestock; ritual fasting against higher-ranking defendants; body-fines and honour-price compensation.Arbitration | Balanced briefing materials, trained neutral moderators and competing experts structured disagreement. | |
| How are public goods funded? | A decentralised stablecoin and open-source contracts; surplus used for token buy-and-burn and rewards rather than external public goods. | Rules on shared grazing, co-operative ploughing, mills and fencing; obligatory hospitality; churches and monasteries; few public works. | Privately funded; produced published results, media coverage and a peer-reviewed study. | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance; risk parameters are set by human votes using quantitative models. | None; a medieval legal order. | No AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Concentration of voting power, low turnout, liquidation failures in market stress, reliance on centralised collateral and regulatory exposure. | Status-graded and unequal protection, unfree labour, endemic raiding and dynastic war, and vulnerability to a centralising conqueror.CLM-0385 | Self-selection into attendance; artificial setting; analysis by the method's designers; no institutional uptake. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.