How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | MKR- (now SKY-) weighted polls and executive votes on code changes, with delegation and a governance delay; restructured under the Endgame Plan and its rulebook. | Kings of small kingdoms (túatha) under over-kings; assemblies (óenach); customary law expounded by hereditary jurists rather than legislated. | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | On-chain votes and forum debate; losses absorbed by minting and auctioning governance tokens; compensation decided by token votes without legal obligation. | Brehon judges; sureties (naidm, ráth, aitire); distraint of livestock; ritual fasting against higher-ranking defendants; body-fines and honour-price compensation.Arbitration | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | |
| How are public goods funded? | A decentralised stablecoin and open-source contracts; surplus used for token buy-and-burn and rewards rather than external public goods. | Rules on shared grazing, co-operative ploughing, mills and fencing; obligatory hospitality; churches and monasteries; few public works. | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance; risk parameters are set by human votes using quantitative models. | None; a medieval legal order. | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | |
| What are the main risks? | Concentration of voting power, low turnout, liquidation failures in market stress, reliance on centralised collateral and regulatory exposure. | Status-graded and unequal protection, unfree labour, endemic raiding and dynastic war, and vulnerability to a centralising conqueror.CLM-0385 | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.