How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Token-weighted executable and social proposals, with delegation; working groups run by three elected stewards; constitutional amendments need two-thirds and 1% participation. | Unknown | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Constitutional limits on majorities; dissolution votes freeze working-group funds; a 4-of-8 Security Council can cancel malicious proposals. | Unknown | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Registration fees fund ENS development first and other public goods second, including a Public Goods working group. | Unknown | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance. | Unknown | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | |
| What are the main risks? | Governance capture through low turnout, reliance on a few delegates and stewards, and temporary trust in the Security Council. | Unknown | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.