How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Token House votes by OP holdings (30% quorum; 51% or 76% thresholds); Citizens' House votes one member one vote; both can veto protocol upgrades reviewed by a Developer Advisory Board.Digital identity | A statutory authority (UIDAI) under the central government sets rules; ministries decide where Aadhaar is required; Parliament legislated in 2016 and 2019.Digital identity | A stratified random sample of 523 voters deliberated in moderated groups and plenaries and answered questionnaires before and after; no decisions were taken.Sortition / citizens' assembly | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Veto periods with appeal and resubmission; Foundation moderation and Code of Conduct enforcement; suspension of suspected Sybil citizens. | Grievance channels at UIDAI and service agencies; constitutional challenges in the Supreme Court, which ruled in 2017 and 2018. | Balanced briefing materials, trained neutral moderators and competing experts structured disagreement. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Retro Funding and grants financed by a treasury that receives a share of Superchain revenue. | A universal, low-cost proof of identity used for welfare transfers, financial inclusion and public services. | Privately funded; produced published results, media coverage and a peer-reviewed study. | |
| How is AI used? | None in decision-making; Retro Funding moved towards metrics-based allocation computed by software, and AI assistants for voters have been proposed by community members. | No AI in decision-making as such; automated biometric matching and deduplication decide authentication, and face authentication was added in 2018. | No AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Low tokenholder engagement, Foundation discretion over citizenship and treasury, difficulty measuring impact, and token-price dependence of public-goods budgets. | Exclusion through authentication failures, data leaks, surveillance and profiling, weak independent oversight and function creep.CLM-0544 | Self-selection into attendance; artificial setting; analysis by the method's designers; no institutional uptake. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.