How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Token House votes by OP holdings (30% quorum; 51% or 76% thresholds); Citizens' House votes one member one vote; both can veto protocol upgrades reviewed by a Developer Advisory Board.Digital identity | Kings of small kingdoms (túatha) under over-kings; assemblies (óenach); customary law expounded by hereditary jurists rather than legislated. | A stratified random sample of 523 voters deliberated in moderated groups and plenaries and answered questionnaires before and after; no decisions were taken.Sortition / citizens' assembly | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Veto periods with appeal and resubmission; Foundation moderation and Code of Conduct enforcement; suspension of suspected Sybil citizens. | Brehon judges; sureties (naidm, ráth, aitire); distraint of livestock; ritual fasting against higher-ranking defendants; body-fines and honour-price compensation.Arbitration | Balanced briefing materials, trained neutral moderators and competing experts structured disagreement. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Retro Funding and grants financed by a treasury that receives a share of Superchain revenue. | Rules on shared grazing, co-operative ploughing, mills and fencing; obligatory hospitality; churches and monasteries; few public works. | Privately funded; produced published results, media coverage and a peer-reviewed study. | |
| How is AI used? | None in decision-making; Retro Funding moved towards metrics-based allocation computed by software, and AI assistants for voters have been proposed by community members. | None; a medieval legal order. | No AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Low tokenholder engagement, Foundation discretion over citizenship and treasury, difficulty measuring impact, and token-price dependence of public-goods budgets. | Status-graded and unequal protection, unfree labour, endemic raiding and dynastic war, and vulnerability to a centralising conqueror.CLM-0385 | Self-selection into attendance; artificial setting; analysis by the method's designers; no institutional uptake. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.