How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Token House votes by OP holdings (30% quorum; 51% or 76% thresholds); Citizens' House votes one member one vote; both can veto protocol upgrades reviewed by a Developer Advisory Board.Digital identity | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | A stratified random sample of 523 voters deliberated in moderated groups and plenaries and answered questionnaires before and after; no decisions were taken.Sortition / citizens' assembly | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Veto periods with appeal and resubmission; Foundation moderation and Code of Conduct enforcement; suspension of suspected Sybil citizens. | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | Balanced briefing materials, trained neutral moderators and competing experts structured disagreement. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Retro Funding and grants financed by a treasury that receives a share of Superchain revenue. | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | Privately funded; produced published results, media coverage and a peer-reviewed study. | |
| How is AI used? | None in decision-making; Retro Funding moved towards metrics-based allocation computed by software, and AI assistants for voters have been proposed by community members. | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | No AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Low tokenholder engagement, Foundation discretion over citizenship and treasury, difficulty measuring impact, and token-price dependence of public-goods budgets. | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 | Self-selection into attendance; artificial setting; analysis by the method's designers; no institutional uptake. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.