How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Village assemblies or headmen set opening days, quotas, tools and labour duties; rights belong to member households. | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | Each listed body sets its own well-being objectives and steps; the Welsh Ministers publish national indicators and a future trends report after each election. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Rotating village guards patrol and fine violators, with sanctions graduated by severity; land disputes with the state go to the courts. | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | The Commissioner may review a body and recommend; the body must take reasonable steps to follow or publish reasons (s 22). The Auditor General examines application of the principle. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Firewood, fodder, thatch, fertiliser litter and later collectively managed timber plantations, maintained by compulsory communal labour. | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | Covers the Welsh Ministers, local authorities, health boards, national park authorities and other listed bodies; public services boards plan locally. | |
| How is AI used? | None. Rules and enforcement are entirely human and customary. | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | No documented AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Loss of economic value, cheap timber imports, depopulation, exclusionary membership rules and state pressure to individualise rights. | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 | Soft 'follow or explain' enforcement; procedural compliance; difficulty measuring long-term and preventative benefits. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.