How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | + Model | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Informal consensus within each harbour gang; formally, zone councils elected by licence holders propose trap limits and fishing hours, some subject to a two-thirds referendum. | Kings of small kingdoms (túatha) under over-kings; assemblies (óenach); customary law expounded by hereditary jurists rather than legislated. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Warnings and covert trap cutting enforce territories; state marine patrol enforces size limits, trap tags and zone rules. | Brehon judges; sureties (naidm, ráth, aitire); distraint of livestock; ritual fasting against higher-ranking defendants; body-fines and honour-price compensation.Arbitration | |
| How are public goods funded? | Conservation of breeding stock (egg-bearing females, V-notching, maximum size), monitoring and enforcement. | Rules on shared grazing, co-operative ploughing, mills and fencing; obligatory hospitality; churches and monasteries; few public works. | |
| How is AI used? | None. Trap tags and licence databases are administrative, not AI-based. | None; a medieval legal order. | |
| What are the main risks? | Exclusion of newcomers, violent 'cut wars', dependence on one species, ocean warming and federal whale-protection rules.CLM-0510 | Status-graded and unequal protection, unfree labour, endemic raiding and dynastic war, and vulnerability to a centralising conqueror.CLM-0385 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.