How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Each subak's assembly (paruman) of member farmers sets planting dates, work and fines under its own rules (awig-awig); water temples coordinate schedules between subaks. | Unknown | Kings of small kingdoms (túatha) under over-kings; assemblies (óenach); customary law expounded by hereditary jurists rather than legislated. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Disputes are heard by subak heads and assemblies; conflicts between upstream and downstream subaks are negotiated at shared temples. | Unknown | Brehon judges; sureties (naidm, ráth, aitire); distraint of livestock; ritual fasting against higher-ranking defendants; body-fines and honour-price compensation.Arbitration | |
| How are public goods funded? | Proportional water division, canal maintenance, pest control through synchronised fallowing and shared ritual. | Unknown | Rules on shared grazing, co-operative ploughing, mills and fencing; obligatory hospitality; churches and monasteries; few public works. | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance. Lansing's computer simulations were research tools that informed, but did not run, scheduling. | Unknown | None; a medieval legal order. | |
| What are the main risks? | Conversion of rice land to housing and tourism, water competition with hotels, falling water tables and state programmes that ignore local coordination. | Unknown | Status-graded and unequal protection, unfree labour, endemic raiding and dynastic war, and vulnerability to a centralising conqueror.CLM-0385 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.