How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Each subak's assembly (paruman) of member farmers sets planting dates, work and fines under its own rules (awig-awig); water temples coordinate schedules between subaks. | A statutory authority (UIDAI) under the central government sets rules; ministries decide where Aadhaar is required; Parliament legislated in 2016 and 2019.Digital identity | Communes and elected councils at neighbourhood, district, canton and inter-region levels; co-chairs and a 40% minimum quota for either sex (Rojava Information Center).Popular assembly | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Disputes are heard by subak heads and assemblies; conflicts between upstream and downstream subaks are negotiated at shared temples. | Grievance channels at UIDAI and service agencies; constitutional challenges in the Supreme Court, which ruled in 2017 and 2018. | Commune reconciliation committees; regional Justice Councils administer tribunals and coordinate sentencing guidelines (Rojava Information Center). | |
| How are public goods funded? | Proportional water division, canal maintenance, pest control through synchronised fallowing and shared ritual. | A universal, low-cost proof of identity used for welfare transfers, financial inclusion and public services. | Regional offices and commissions for health, economy and natural resources; the administration controlled the area's oil extraction until integration (Crisis Group). | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance. Lansing's computer simulations were research tools that informed, but did not run, scheduling. | No AI in decision-making as such; automated biometric matching and deduplication decide authentication, and face authentication was added in 2018. | No documented AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Conversion of rice land to housing and tourism, water competition with hotels, falling water tables and state programmes that ignore local coordination. | Exclusion through authentication failures, data leaks, surveillance and profiling, weak independent oversight and function creep.CLM-0544 | Turkish military action; reliance on external security partners; documented displacement abuses; contested terms of integration with Damascus.CLM-0279CLM-0280 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.