How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Each subak's assembly (paruman) of member farmers sets planting dates, work and fines under its own rules (awig-awig); water temples coordinate schedules between subaks. | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | Each listed body sets its own well-being objectives and steps; the Welsh Ministers publish national indicators and a future trends report after each election. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Disputes are heard by subak heads and assemblies; conflicts between upstream and downstream subaks are negotiated at shared temples. | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | The Commissioner may review a body and recommend; the body must take reasonable steps to follow or publish reasons (s 22). The Auditor General examines application of the principle. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Proportional water division, canal maintenance, pest control through synchronised fallowing and shared ritual. | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | Covers the Welsh Ministers, local authorities, health boards, national park authorities and other listed bodies; public services boards plan locally. | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance. Lansing's computer simulations were research tools that informed, but did not run, scheduling. | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | No documented AI role. | |
| What are the main risks? | Conversion of rice land to housing and tourism, water competition with hotels, falling water tables and state programmes that ignore local coordination. | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 | Soft 'follow or explain' enforcement; procedural compliance; difficulty measuring long-term and preventative benefits. |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.