How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Each subak's assembly (paruman) of member farmers sets planting dates, work and fines under its own rules (awig-awig); water temples coordinate schedules between subaks. | Each listed body sets its own well-being objectives and steps; the Welsh Ministers publish national indicators and a future trends report after each election. | Unknown | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Disputes are heard by subak heads and assemblies; conflicts between upstream and downstream subaks are negotiated at shared temples. | The Commissioner may review a body and recommend; the body must take reasonable steps to follow or publish reasons (s 22). The Auditor General examines application of the principle. | Unknown | |
| How are public goods funded? | Proportional water division, canal maintenance, pest control through synchronised fallowing and shared ritual. | Covers the Welsh Ministers, local authorities, health boards, national park authorities and other listed bodies; public services boards plan locally. | Unknown | |
| How is AI used? | None in governance. Lansing's computer simulations were research tools that informed, but did not run, scheduling. | No documented AI role. | Unknown | |
| What are the main risks? | Conversion of rice land to housing and tourism, water competition with hotels, falling water tables and state programmes that ignore local coordination. | Soft 'follow or explain' enforcement; procedural compliance; difficulty measuring long-term and preventative benefits. | Unknown |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.