How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Online petitions with signature thresholds, a city-wide survey and collaborative editing fed a 30-member drafting group; a 100-member partly appointed assembly adopted the text by qualified majority. | Unknown | The Prime Minister is formally responsible for Diella; the Constitutional Court states AI cannot change who exercises public power or bears accountability. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | Signature thresholds guaranteed graduated responses; disputes over the final text were settled in the assembly and later before the Supreme Court. | Unknown | Opposition challenged the decrees before the Constitutional Court, which dismissed the request on 8 October 2026; its full reasoning is pending. | |
| How are public goods funded? | A low-cost online platform; the resulting constitution enshrines rights to the city, a healthy environment and indigenous rights. | Unknown | Aims to improve public-service access and reduce discretion in public procurement. | |
| How is AI used? | No AI role. | Unknown | Chatbot and voice assistant on e-Albania; a procurement system tender was still being prepared in August 2026. | |
| What are the main risks? | Digital divide; organisers' own metrics of influence; partly appointed assembly; petitions favouring organised campaigns.CLM-0484 | Unknown | Unclear accountability for an AI 'minister'; no AI law yet; no published technical detail; AKSHI's leaders face a tender-rigging case.CLM-0359 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.