How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | The City Council and CLES convene anchor-institution leaders; each anchor sets its own procurement and employment policy within UK procurement law. | Unknown | Kings of small kingdoms (túatha) under over-kings; assemblies (óenach); customary law expounded by hereditary jurists rather than legislated. | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | No formal mechanism: collaboration is voluntary among independent institutions. | Unknown | Brehon judges; sureties (naidm, ráth, aitire); distraint of livestock; ritual fasting against higher-ranking defendants; body-fines and honour-price compensation.Arbitration | |
| How are public goods funded? | Living Wage employment, £100m of pension investment in Preston and South Ribble, and a Preston Co-operative Development Network with UCLan.Cooperative ownership | Unknown | Rules on shared grazing, co-operative ploughing, mills and fencing; obligatory hospitality; churches and monasteries; few public works. | |
| How is AI used? | No documented AI role. | Unknown | None; a medieval legal order. | |
| What are the main risks? | Attribution of outcomes is uncertain; critics call localist procurement 'zero sum' (Demos); dependence on public-sector anchors under austerity.CLM-0295CLM-0958 | Unknown | Status-graded and unequal protection, unfree labour, endemic raiding and dynastic war, and vulnerability to a centralising conqueror.CLM-0385 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.