How each model solves the same problems
Instead of “democracy versus anarchism”, compare the concrete ways collective problems get solved.
| Question | ✕ | ✕ | ✕ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| How are decisions made? | Each listed body sets its own well-being objectives and steps; the Welsh Ministers publish national indicators and a future trends report after each election. | Power concentrated in the party centre and in Xi Jinping as 'core'; central commissions chaired by Xi; presidential term limits removed in 2018; party bodies absorbed government functions. | A statutory authority (UIDAI) under the central government sets rules; ministries decide where Aadhaar is required; Parliament legislated in 2016 and 2019.Digital identity | |
| How are conflicts resolved? | The Commissioner may review a body and recommend; the body must take reasonable steps to follow or publish reasons (s 22). The Auditor General examines application of the principle. | Party discipline commissions and supervisory commissions with extrajudicial detention (liuzhi); courts under party leadership; online petition and complaint platforms. | Grievance channels at UIDAI and service agencies; constitutional challenges in the Supreme Court, which ruled in 2017 and 2018. | |
| How are public goods funded? | Covers the Welsh Ministers, local authorities, health boards, national park authorities and other listed bodies; public services boards plan locally. | State-led industrial policy, poverty-alleviation campaigns, infrastructure; local governments squeezed by debt and reduced land revenue. | A universal, low-cost proof of identity used for welfare transfers, financial inclusion and public services. | |
| How is AI used? | No documented AI role. | AI-enabled surveillance (facial recognition, big-data policing, IJOP in Xinjiang); algorithmic routing of citizen complaints. | No AI in decision-making as such; automated biometric matching and deduplication decide authentication, and face authentication was added in 2018. | |
| What are the main risks? | Soft 'follow or explain' enforcement; procedural compliance; difficulty measuring long-term and preventative benefits. | Unchecked personal power and succession uncertainty, mass repression in Xinjiang and Tibet, surveillance, reduced local initiative, and policy errors without public correction.CLM-1095 | Exclusion through authentication failures, data leaks, surveillance and profiling, weak independent oversight and function creep.CLM-0544 |
This illustrates differences in design; it is not a universal claim about outcomes. Each cell links to mechanisms and the claims behind them.