Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
Douglass C. North,Barry R. Weingast — Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England (1989)Douglass C. North; Barry R. Weingast · 1989 · Article · AbstractDisputedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0599 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: New institutional economics · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“North and Weingast argued that institutions established after 1688 let the English Crown commit credibly to property rights, lowering borrowing costs; Sussman and Yafeh found that British interest rates stayed high and volatile for about four decades afterwards.”
Evidence that supports
1Evidence that contradicts
1Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690–1790
Nathan Sussman,Yishay Yafeh — Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690–1790 (2006)Nathan Sussman; Yishay Yafeh · 2006 · Article · AbstractStatus history
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