Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
Anna Persson,Bo Rothstein,Jan Teorell — Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem (2013)Anna Persson; Bo Rothstein; Jan Teorell · 2013 · Article · AbstractDisputedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0597 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Principal–agent theory of government · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“Persson, Rothstein and Teorell argued, from interviews in Kenya and Uganda, that anti-corruption reforms based on principal–agent assumptions fail in systemically corrupt settings because corruption there resembles a collective action problem without non-corruptible principals.”
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Context
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government
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