Polity Atlas
DisputedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0597 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Principal–agent theory of government · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team

“Persson, Rothstein and Teorell argued, from interviews in Kenya and Uganda, that anti-corruption reforms based on principal–agent assumptions fail in systemically corrupt settings because corruption there resembles a collective action problem without non-corruptible principals.”

Evidence that supports

1

Evidence that contradicts

0

No counter-evidence recorded.

Context

Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms

Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies

Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government

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