Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Michael C. Jensen,William H. Meckling — Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Michael C. Jensen; William H. Meckling · 1976 · Article · Section 2EstablishedSource attached · not independently reviewedCLM-0595 · as of 2026-10-27 · about: Principal–agent theory of government · Author: Polity Atlas editorial team
“Jensen and Meckling formalised agency costs as the sum of the principal's monitoring expenditures, the agent's bonding expenditures and the residual loss from divergence between the agent's decisions and those that would maximise the principal's welfare.”
Evidence that supports
2Integrity as a bonding mechanism in agency theory
Sinclair Davidson — Integrity as a bonding mechanism in agency theory (2026)Sinclair Davidson · 2026 · Article · IntroductionEvidence that contradicts
0No counter-evidence recorded.
Context
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem
The New Economics of Organization
Status history
No earlier revisions.
Disputes
No disputes have been filed.